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Any reader of Israel Studies recent issue on the Americanization of Israel 
would be likely to conclude that the most important aspect of US-Israel 
relations was cultural and religious exchange.1 American commodification of 
Israeli consumption is a key focus here, as is the impact of American religious 
trends on Israeli religious practices. Though politics does feature in the 
issue, its place is largely restricted to the influence of the US on the Israeli 
party political system and to the ideological convergence between Christian 
fundamentalism and the Likud Party. The informing conception of the issue, 
then, seems to be the endeavour to pinpoint those aspects of Israel that have 
been Americanised in recent years. Contributors are thus preoccupied with 
determining how specific American forms and norms have migrated to and 
been translated into Israeli culture and society.
 However valuable such an approach might be in tracing interesting 
connections between the US and Israel, it is very poorly equipped to tackle 
a major dimension of American-Israeli relations: US state support for Israeli 
colonialism. The questions never raised include the following: What has 
American support for Israel actually meant for the Israeli state? Which state 
capacities have been enhanced and which curtailed as a result of this support 
(importantly, force or peace)? And what impact has this had on Israeli society 
and economy at large? To answer such questions would involve specifying 
the nature of US involvement in Israel-Palestine, spelling out the kinds of 
policies and objectives the US state has allowed the Israeli state to pursue. It 
would, in fact, involve raising the spectre of Israel as a colonial and occupying 
power; and this the various contributors to Israel Studies seem unwilling to do. 
Colonialism and occupation are far from mainstream concerns in the Israeli 
academy. This may sound strange since these practices have defined the 
history of Israel since 1967 if not before. Yet it is not so strange if one considers 
that in this respect the Israeli academy merely reflects the attitudes of wider 
Israeli society: academic evasion mirrors popular denial and indifference.
 One group of academics that has managed to break away from this 
stifling national consensus has been dubbed post-Zionist. Though by no 
means a unified or politically homogenous trend, post-Zionism has come to 
characterise a certain critical engagement with Israeli history and society that 
has led to a re-examination of Israels founding myths and ideology. Broadly 
speaking, it has been defined as follows: In a general sense, postzionism is 
a term applied to a current set of critical positions that problematize Zionist 
discourse, and the historical narratives and social and cultural representations 
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that it produced.2 Inherited Zionist versions of Israeli history and society 
have thus been debunked. 
 In the field of history, their main contribution has been about the causes, 
character, and course of the Arab-Israeli conflict, where Zionist historiography 
has been challenged and proven fallacious.3 Based on research conducted 
in newly-opened Israeli archives, this revisionist history has, for example, 
clearly documented: that Palestinians were expelled in 1948  as Palestinians 
themselves have always maintained  rather than being asked to leave by 
Arab invading armies, as Israeli propaganda has it;4 that Arab armies never 
intended to liberate Palestine, with Jordan colluding with the Zionists to 
divide it; that Israel consistently shunned peace and settlement of the refugee 
problem at every opportunity in the early years; and, finally, that Israel 
has always been the powerful side in the conflict and the party responsible 
for denying Palestinian rights and national restitution.5 The picture that 
emerges here entirely reverses the conventional orthodoxy about victims and 
victimisers: Israel is seen as an ongoing perpetrator of a massive injustice 
against the Palestinians. (Whether it is a justified injustice is a political not a 
historical question. What is really quite unique about many of the post-Zionist 
historians (Pappe excluded) is that while they do actually acknowledge what 
has happened in 1948 they end up justifying it nonetheless in the name 
of Zionism-as-refugee from anti-Semitism. Edward Said has described this 
position as a profound contradiction, bordering on schizophrenia.6) Edward 
Said has summed up the collective contribution of this revisionism in the 
following terms: It is certainly true that the great political importance today 
of the new Israeli historians is that they have confirmed what generations of 
Palestinians, historians or otherwise, have been saying about what happened 
to us as a people at the hands of Israel.7 And this judgment also applies to 
Israels new critical sociologists.
 In the field of sociology, Jewish-Israeli history and society has for the first 
time been examined without the blinkers of Jewish particularism and Israeli 
exceptionalism.8 A crucial development here has been the analysis of Israel 
as a colonial-settler state and society, both in foundation and in continuing 
practice. Dubbed the colonization model, this literature depicts Israel as 
a settler-colonial society driven by the needs of territorial acquisition and 
pressures of the labour market, and it regards the Israeli-Arab conflict as the 
most crucial determinant in the shaping of Israeli society.9 Spearheaded 
by Baruch Kimmerling and Gershon Shafir, this research has been deeply 
preoccupied with both charting the specific features of Jewish colonisation of 
Palestine and comparing it to other settler-colonies like America and South 
Africa.10 Jewish colonisation should thus be understood as a late instance of 
European overseas expansion.11 Its unique features are the following: Jewish 
conquest of land and labour; pioneering and settlement; historical-biblical 
rights as justification; and the construction of what Avishai Ehrlich calls a 
permanent war society.12 Shafir, for example, has shown how the failure 
of capitalist settlement in Palestine led the Jewish Yishuv to construct the 
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ideology and practice of Labour Zionism, in which national colonisation 
was spearheaded by Jewish labour and supported by Jewish capital under 
the leadership of colonising bureaucratic elites. The nation in Zionism thus 
emerges from this research as primary and determining. National primacy 
stifles class conflict, silences dissent and internal democracy, and sidelines 
social solidarity and egalitarianism, while Zionists conquer and dispossess 
Palestine.13 Israel is therefore seen as a colonial-nationalist state: colonialism 
is constitutive to state-formation and nation-building, and continues to 
determine the allocation of power, rights, and privileges in Israel to this 
day.14 
 For the first time in Israeli history, then, colonialism has become a serious 
topic of academic research and examination. Israeli economy, history, politics, 
and society can now be analysed and studied using the colonisation paradigm. 
What is important to note here, however, is that the academy was not the 
trailblazer on this front. Such analysis existed outside of the academy since 
at least the early 1960s in Israel.15 As Uri Ram has noted: The agenda of the 
Matzpen (The Israeli Socialist Organization) group exemplifies the emergence 
of an explicit colonization perspective in Israeli society.16 Founded in 1962, 
Matzpen (Compass, in Hebrew) was an anti-Stalinist, anti-Zionist splinter 
from the Israeli Communist Party which was particularly close to radical 
Palestinian activists and communists inside Israel.17 Collectively, it launched 
the Israel as colonial-settler state analysis, and continued to develop it 
in its magazine Khamsin: Journal of Revolutionary Socialists of the Middle East 
published from London, where many of its members ended up as a result 
of state persecution and repression.18 A specimen of their most important 
contributions can be gleaned in The Class Nature of Israeli Society, an essay 
they published in New Left Review in 1971. Here exactly the same emphases of 
the critical sociologists of the 1980s are clearly evident: labour colonisation, 
class collaborationism in Zionism, and bureaucratic control: 
Israeli society is not merely a society of immigrants; it is one of settlers. 
This society, including its working class, was shaped through a process 
of colonization  The permanent conflict between settlers society and 
the indigenous, displaced Palestinian Arabs has never stopped and it has 
shaped the very structure of Israeli sociology, politics, and economics.
In Israel the dominant ideology was never a capitalist one; it was a 
blend of bourgeois elements combined with dominant themes and ideas 
typical of the Zionist Labour movement, ideas derived from the socialist 
movement in Eastern Europe but transformed to express the aims of 
political Zionism.19
There is clearly much common ground between 1980s sociologists and 1960s 
Matzpen, and this is an important recognition of Matzpens critical rigour. 
There is also, however, one crucial divergence between them: their analysis 
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of Western influence in the region after the establishment of Israel in 1948. 
For Matzpen, it takes the form of imperialism and is constitutive to the making 
of Israel and to shaping its role in the region. Israels policy towards Arabs 
and Palestinians cannot be understood in its entirety without considering the 
role and interests of Western powers: 
it is clear that Israels foreign and military policies cannot be deduced 
from the dynamics of the internal social conflicts alone. The entire 
Israeli economy is founded on the special political and military role 
which Zionism, and the settlers society, fulfil in the Middle East as a 
whole. If Israel is viewed in isolation from the rest of the Middle East 
there is no explanation for the fact that 70 per cent of the capital inflow 
is not intended for economic gain and is not subject to considerations of 
profitability.20
Imperialist subsidy, then, but for a reason: Israels role as watchdog of US 
interests in the region after 1967: Israel is a unique case in the Middle East; it is 
financed by imperialism without being economically exploited by it. This has always 
been the case in the past: imperialism used Israel for its political purposes 
and paid for this by economic support.21 There is no reason at all to conclude 
from this analysis that everything Israel does is caused by external pressure 
or foreign interest in order to be able to appreciate the significant connection 
that Matzpen makes between imperialism and Israeli settler-colonialism. 
This is in fact what is novel about their argument: it combines those specific 
exogenous and endogenous factors in the analysis of Israeli state objectives 
and social dynamics. Israel is thus seen as a Zionist-colonial project that is 
constitutively aligned with Western interests in the region: state structure and 
colonising project are sustained and consolidated by Western powers while 
Western objectives are fulfilled and realised. Such a consistent geopolitical 
configuration has provided Israel with both opportunities (avoid reversing 
colonial expansion) and constraints (being ready and willing to protect 
vital Western interests in the region): the wars of 1956 and 1967 constitute 
important markers in this pattern (as I argue below). 
 In the shift from the 1960s to the 1980s, then, the Western imperialism 
part of the colonisation model is dropped and forgotten. As Israel as 
colonial-settler state develops in the academy, Israels subsidy and support 
by US imperialism loses its constitutive value in the analysis of the Israeli 
polity. In fact, a positive assessment of the US role in the region is introduced 
in its place. 
 For post-Zionists, the United States can do no wrong; it is in fact a model 
to emulate and a country that Israel should aspire to be. While being critical 
of Israels foundation and continuing practice, post-Zionists have been 
exceptionally uncritical of the US. Tom Segevs Elvis in Jerusalem: Post-Zionism 
and the Americanization of Israel is an excellent example in this regard. Segev, 
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founding myth and documenting its abuse of the Holocaust,22 has been 
completely blind to the question that US-Israel relations may have had serious 
negative effects on Israel or have led to the consolidation of state-sponsored 
colonialism in the Occupied Territories. There is a strong correlation in his 
work between Americanisation, erosion of old forms of Zionist collectivist 
values, and the freeing up of the individual from constricting structures. 
Israel, he argues, is becoming more like the US in political, social, and cultural 
norms. Israels media has been Americanised, as have its protest movements 
(which he compares to American protest movements of the 1960s, no less), 
its multiculturalist pluralism, new judicial civil rights activism, and political 
culture. One particularly crucial connection between the US and Israel that 
post-Zionists like Segev keep on repeating seems central to their worldview: the 
US is good for Israel because it pushes Israel to compromise, accommodate 
to the region, and make peace. Segev puts it thus:
This American [peace] spirit, which produced the Camp David agreements 
between Israel and Egypt, would later lead people to feel they had 
had enough of the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip [which 
miraculously continues]. It also produced Israels unilateral withdrawal 
from Lebanon in 2000 [not Hizballah resistance]. The peace agreements 
with Egypt and Jordan and the agreements between Israel and the 
Palestinians were all signed under the sponsorship of the United States 
and due to intense personal involvement of the sitting president [not as 
a result of the October/Yom Kippur War of 1973, that is, Arab readiness 
to use force]. All these agreements were made possible, to a large extent, 
because of the willingness of the American people to finance them. They 
also reflect Israels dependence on the US, and the depth of American 
penetration of all areas of Israeli life.23 
The portrait Segev draws here is idealist in the extreme: after the 1960s the 
US has developed a peace culture which it has been busy spreading in the 
Middle East ever since: no strategic interests, no geopolitical considerations 
or wars are relevant. In Segevs world, such material factors seem to have no 
role to play in the American presence in the Middle East. 
 For post-Zionists, then, the association between the US and peace is strong 
and pervasive. Peace with Egypt comes to emblematise US intervention in 
the region, and breeds a certain political illusion in Israel (as well as for 
the Palestinians, as I argue below) that the US is as interested in settling the 
Arab-Israeli conflict as it was in exchanging the return of Sinai to Egypt for 
Egyptian peace with Israel. What is never appreciated here is that Camp 
David (forcing Israel to reverse its occupation of Sinai, or in other words, to 
decolonise Sinai) is an exception not the rule, and has come about mainly 
because of Egypts use of massive force in the 1973 war. The post-Zionists 
thus neglect the unique features of the Egyptian-Israeli peace settlement. 
They also, significantly, fail to recognise how unjust and totally rejectionist 
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of Palestinian rights it was. Writing immediately after Camp David, Fayez 
Sayegh put it exceptionally well: The Camp David Framework thus bestows 
American-Egyptian legitimacy upon the continued Israeli occupation of the 
Palestinian areas in question for years to come. It allows Israel to maintain and 
expand settlements in the Occupied Territories, and leaves the Palestinians 
with no right of self-determination or sovereignty: A fraction of the Palestinian 
people (under one-third of the whole) may attain a fraction of its rights (not 
including its inalienable right to self-determination and statehood) in a 
fraction of its homeland (less than one-fifth of the area of the whole).24 No 
peace here, only more suffering, dispersal, and occupation. 
 With the signing of the Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO in 
1993, the same correlation between the US and peace emerges again among 
post-Zionists, even though the actors, powers, and circumstances are totally 
different here. Shafir and Peled see Oslo as a time of lasting American peace 
and decolonisation. This structures their reading of the 1990s in Israel: 
economic liberalisation, they argue, is inseparable from political liberalisation 
and the ending of the occupation (a word never even mentioned in the Oslo 
Accords). Uncritically endorsing Bush Srs vision of the New World Order as 
a time of peace and prosperity for all, Shafir and Peled contend that [b]oth 
globalization and decolonization may, then, be viewed as sharing the goal of 
replacing political mechanisms and forces, identified with the nation and the 
nation-state, with financial and commercial ties which, on their part, are global 
forces.25 The frontier, exclusionary society that Zionism has built is thus on 
the decline, being slowly replaced by a liberalised nation, both economically 
and politically. And the Israeli business community plays a leading role in 
this new neo-liberal peace-and-privatisation bloc: The liberal economic 
values of the Israeli business community are naturally more consonant with 
a liberal conception of citizenship than with the ethno-republican conception 
of pioneering civic virtue. Thus, these business leaders have been promoting 
liberal reforms not only in the economy, but also in civil rights, the electoral 
system, health care, education, mass communications, and other areas of 
social life.26 And this puts Israeli business in the position of contributing 
to emancipating the non-citizen Palestinian residents of the Occupied 
Territories.27 The symbol of this triple process of economic privatisation, 
political liberalisation and peace has been captured by Uri Ram: A pamphlet 
of the Peace Now movement from the Oslo Accord period exposes explicitly 
the link between peace and prosperity. From the seed of peace your economic 
growth will flourish declares the pamphlet. The pamphlet is decorated with 
a figure of a flower cut from an American dollar bill. The flower symbolizes 
locality and life, the dollar globality and wealth.28 The dollar flower 
accurately captures the post-Zionist position, and comes to obscure the fact 
that Oslo was neither about decolonisation nor about the ending of conflict, 
Palestinian sovereignty, or halting the settlement drive. Meron Benvenisti, 
an ex-Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem and contributor to Haaretz, recognised 
this from the beginning. Rather than reading Oslo from a post-national 
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perspective, he stated unequivocally on reviewing the Accords that: one can 
hardly not recognize that Israeli victory was absolute and Palestinians defeat 
abject.29 No dilution of Israeli nationalism here: a total victory versus a total 
capitulation. One nationalism is up, the other down. 
 The only political sociologist to contest this post-Zionist association 
between the US and peace, economic and political liberalisations, is Avishai 
Ehrlich. Ehrlich has updated and developed the Matzpen connection between 
US imperialism and Israeli colonialism and has argued that post-Zionism is a 
local version of US ideological globalization.30 He strongly contradicts all the 
basic premises of this approach: end of conflict, peace of the business class, 
more democracy and secularism and less Judeocentrism, and diminishing 
role of nation state. Ehrlich reads a crude reductionism and economism in 
the post-Zionist account of the 1990s. There is no peace, stability, or liberality 
under US hegemony, he contends. The conflict will indeed intensify, and 
this everybody comes to recognise by the time of the outbreak of the al-Aqsa 
Intifada, which comes to mark the end of post-Zionism.31 If Segev blames this 
on Palestinian terror,32 Shafir and Peled are here much more cautious and 
recognise that it is Israeli colonialism that is to blame: A clear indication 
that the colonial drive has not spent itself yet is the doubling of the Israeli 
settler population in the O[ccupied] T[erritories] since 1993. This was one 
of the main reasons for the resumption, in September 2000, of the intifada 
that the Oslo Accords were meant to end.33 Ehrlichs important reading 
thus holds: under US-sponsored peace, Zionism-as-colonialism continues 
and becomes entrenched, ending both the reigns of Labour and Revisionist 
Zionisms and transforming Zionism into a political religion: Both [versions] 
have been replaced by religion as the source of political legitimation for the 
state of Israel and for its continued control and colonization of the whole of 
Palestine  political religion is the use of religion to explain the cohesion 
and uniqueness of the ethos, its history and ethos; it is the use of religion as 
an argument for the claim to territory and justification of political measures 
to defend the national project.34 The hopes of the post-Zionists for a more 
liberal, less colonialist Israel are thus dashed. They turn out to be based on 
an illusory analysis of both the US role in the region and its real impact on 
Israel. It is clear, then, that the categories of US peace and decolonisation 
have to be conceptually separated and the association between globalisation 
and political liberalisation broken. US hegemony and market fundamentalism 
are in fact much more likely to breed religious fundamentalism than liberal 
values.
 My aim in the following is to show why this set of developments is 
neither unexpected nor surprising. Since 1967, US imperialism and Israeli 
colonialism have, I argue, worked in tandem in order to produce both Israeli 
and American nationalist outcomes. This is the only reasonable conclusion 
one can draw from a closer look at US history in the region, which I consider 
below. By analysing the roots and causes of US support for Israel, its dynamic, 
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in the Middle East have become consistent with supporting the Jewish state 
and defending its colonialist objectives. My argument proceeds as follows: I 
first determine what those US vital interests in the region have historically 
been, and how they have evolved over time. I then go on to utilise this 
structure of ongoing US imperial interests in order to explain the substance 
of US strategy during and after the Cold War, including our contemporary 
moment, and show how crucial Israel has been in the realisation of American 
Empire in the Arab world. Before concluding with a brief description of the 
contemporary ramifications of US empire in Israel-Palestine specifically, I 
trace the major impact that Israeli dependency on American support has 
had on Israeli ideology and society. 
 This, I hope, will clearly show why I believe it is imperative to extend the 
critical analytic engagement accorded to Israel by the academic practitioners 
of the colonisation model to US-Israel relations. Post-Zionism has successfully 
managed to integrate the Arab-Israeli conflict as a constitutive factor in the 
analysis of Israeli state and society, and this has been its greatest achievement. 
It is time to extend this theoretical framework to include relations between 
actually existing US imperialism and actually existing Israeli colonialism 
in the period after 1967. US imperialism should, then, come to be seen as 
an intrinsic factor in the shaping and development of both the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and the structure of the Israeli polity. Relevant here is a rich and 
growing tradition of analysis and radical critique exemplified in Israel by 
Matzpen and in the West by Said, Rodinson and Chomsky.35 Utilising this 
imperialism-colonialism paradigm will not only make a more accurate 
approximation of US-Israel relations and of US interests in the Arab world. It 
will also actively contribute to opening up a public space for critical reflection 
and debate on the US in Israel, a country that seems to be the last bastion of 
uncritical idealism about and identification with US global power. As Segev 
puts it: The full story of the Americanization of Israel has yet to be told, even 
though it is central to the countrys history.36 I hope the following aids this 
process.
US IMPERIALISM AND ISRAELI SETTLER COLONIALISM
The initial point of analysis of US involvement in the region has to be oil. 
Nobody has made this point better and for longer than Noam Chomsky: It 
has been a basic principle of international affairs since World War II that 
the energy reserves of the Middle East constitute an essential element in the 
US-dominated global system. American policy towards affairs of the region 
cannot be understood apart from this fundamental principle.37 And, more 
recently: In 1945, State Department officials described Saudi Arabian energy 
resources as a stupendous source of strategic power, and one of the greatest 
material prizes in world history; the Gulf region generally was considered 
probably the richest economic prize in the field of foreign investment. 
Eisenhower later described it as the most strategically important area of 
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the world.38 Gilbert Achcar has been equally forceful in making this claim, 
and in arguing for the decisive role that the Open Door policy over oil plays 
in US imperial grand strategy: George W. Bushs administration, like his 
fathers administration that waged the first US war against Iraq, is as tightly 
linked to the oil industry as any administration in history. At the risk of 
annoying those who react to any explanation of US foreign policy in terms of 
economic interests, and oil interests in particular, with cries of reductionism, 
the oil lobby has traditionally played a key role in formulating US foreign 
policy, at the very least since the Second World War.39 The Cold War and 
post-Cold War confrontation with enemies (the USSR, Arab independence 
and fundamentalist movements, Iraq after 1991, and Bin Laden), and US 
relations with allies (Europe, Japan, Israel), cannot be understood outside of 
this fact: control of oil is a decisive instrument of global policy.
 Regional stability thus means a Middle East amenable to US primacy. 
During the Cold War, Arab regimes had to be kept away from the USSR 
(to prevent it from gaining a strategic presence in the region) and their 
independent political and economic initiatives had to be stifled, if not 
destroyed. Moderate Arabs are subordinate Arabs, extremists are 
independent ones who go against US interests. Nasser became an extremist 
in the eyes of Washington: after 1956 he became an international symbol 
of Third World independence and Pan-Arabism. His Arab national project 
had therefore to be rolled back because it threatened US dominance in the 
region. Mired in Vietnam, the US wasnt able to do this itself: Israel was 
brought in from the cold to perform this function. After having been forced 
by Eisenhower to return Gaza and Sinai in 1956, Israel was given the green 
light to attack; but this time to serve US not British and French interests. 
As former American Ambassador to Israel Samuel W. Lewis has argued, the 
American relationship with Israel changed from being quite cool and distant, 
as a result of an acute sensitivity to Americas strategic interests, clearly 
identified with Saudi Arabia and its oil reserves, to a strategic alliance in the 
period after 1967.40 Cheryl A. Rubenberg has also emphasised this change 
in policy, and has described it in the following terms: The most important 
outcome of the June War was that for the majority in the policymaking elite, 
Israels spectacular military performance validated the thesis that Israel 
could function as a strategic-asset to the United States in the Middle East  
The belief about Israels strategic utility was expressed in US policy through 
the provision of virtually unlimited quantities of economic assistance and 
military equipment, a de facto alliance between Washington and Israel, and 
in American support for virtually every Israeli foreign policy objective.41 
Israel thus became a tool of regional stability for the US: In the context of the 
Nixon Doctrine, Israel assumed the role of preserving a regional balance of 
power favourable to American interests. This meant, above all, curbing Arab 
radicalism and checking Soviet expansionism in the Middle East. Israels local 
interest in keeping the Arabs in their place neatly converged with the Nixon 
administrations interest in expelling the Soviets from the Middle East.42
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 Nasser and Egyptian Pan-Arab nationalism were not the only victims of 
the US-Israel convergence of interests. The period when this alliance was 
cemented was also the period of the rise of Palestinian nationalism. The 
battle of al-Karamah in which both Palestinian and Jordanian troops defeated 
an Israeli offensive in 1968 propelled the Palestinians onto the historical 
stage. Palestinians became the inheritors of radical nationalism: al-Karamah 
(dignity, in Arabic) turned the PLO into a mass organisation. Calling for the 
liberation of Palestine from Zionist colonialism (backed by US imperialism), 
the PLO, like Nasser, had to be crushed as well. This came to be called Black 
September. Here again the US-Israel alliance proved essential. Nixon and 
Kissinger interpreted the Jordanian civil war with the Palestinian guerrillas 
as a global superpower confrontation, not just a local or regional conflict 
and put the US fleet in the Mediterranean on high alert.43 Israel backed the 
Jordanian monarchy against the PLO and mobilised its army to protect it 
from a Syrian tank invasion (which failed as a result). The Iraqi contingent 
in eastern Jordan failed to come to the assistance of the Palestinians. Nasser 
was equally constrained: having accepted the Rogers Plan, which called for 
the return of the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, Nasser was ready 
to sacrifice his anti-imperialist stance for the return of Egyptian lands. The 
Saudis also stood with King Hussein. The Soviet Union itself, in actual fact, 
had no desire to de-stabilise the state system in the region. Even Arafat himself 
preferred a policy of non-interference with the Arab regimes and wanted 
to focus on liberating Palestine instead. Unlike the more radical Popular 
and Democratic Fronts, Fatah has always believed that Palestine will deliver 
Arab unity, not Arab unity Palestine: or in other words Palestinians should 
not actively seek to become social revolutionaries in the Arab world. Fatahs 
position became difficult to sustain when the Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine was hijacking planes and exploding them in Jordanian airports: 
Jordanian sovereignty was clearly challenged. Palestinians had, therefore, to 
pay the price of their radicalism: all forces converged against them. At its 
moment of inception, then, the Palestinian revolution was defeated by its 
Arab enemies and their imperialist allies. Achcar describes it in the following 
terms:
The year 1970 in any case saw Arab nationalism finished off politically, 
so that the 1967 attack attained its political objectives with a three-year 
lag. This required crushing the other most advanced, most spectacular 
spearhead of the radicalization of the popular movement, which had 
temporarily counter-balanced the military victory of the US-Israel alliance. 
In September 1970 (Black September) the Jordanian army drowned in 
blood the alternative, quasi-state power that the bloc of Palestinian armed 
organizations had built  Thus 1970 was the year of the final rout of 
radical Arab nationalism.44 
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Middle East. Jean Genet, who was then with the guerrillas in Jordan, clearly 
understood what he was witnessing: Id already been told the Palestinian 
Revolution might be summed up in the apocryphal phrase, to have been 
dangerous for a thousandth of a second.45 
 The events of 1970 in Jordan should be regarded as the most 
illuminating in the history of the post-1967 period. The interests of 
global and local actors become clearly visible, and the alliance between US 
imperialism, Israel, and Arab reaction against revolutionary nationalism in 
the region was dramatically played out here. The Arab elites, it transpires, 
feared Arab radicalism much more than they feared the existence of 
Israel: the seeming contradiction between US oil interests and supporting 
Israel turned out to be no contradiction at all. Both were objectively (if 
not subjectively) allied and worked towards the same outcome: anti-
Arab independence and democracy, and pro-Arab authoritarianism and 
dependence on the US. The Arab elite understood this fundamental lesson 
well. The Egyptian infitah policy (economic and political openness) and 
shift towards the West was a clear indication of that. It took the 1973 war 
to convince the US of Sadats clear objectives: peace in return for Egyptian 
territory, while abandoning Palestinian and Arab rights and becoming 
a US client regime.46 As Samir Amin concluded, after surveying these 
developments in his The Arab Nation: the Arab bourgeoisie got what it 
was after: Washington was forced to take it seriously.47 
 Sadats success in retrieving Egyptian territory by aligning with the US 
in the region bred what can be described as a political illusion within the 
Palestinian camp, which would ultimately lead to Oslo. The belief was the 
following: national rights could only be retrieved by becoming politically 
moderate and gaining American acceptance. If Sadat could do it, why 
couldnt Arafat? This logic came to justify future Palestinian capitulation, 
which was only fully realised in Oslo (it needed the second crushing of 
the PLO in Beirut in 1982, the Intifada, and the alienation and weakness 
of the PLO after the Gulf War to create the material conditions for its 
actualisation). But this dangerous assumption neglected the fact that 
there was an important difference between Egypt and the Palestinians: 
strategic significance. Egypt was arguably the most important state in the 
Arab world (in terms of size, position, and capacity) while Palestinians 
were the weakest and most powerless group in the region: dispossessed, 
stateless, and fragmented. Arafat had very little to offer the US (other 
than recognising Israel), while Sadat could offer them peace with Israel 
and legitimation of the status quo. The only way that Palestinians could be 
strategically significant was by actively threatening US-Israel domination. 
And that required getting organised and mobilised and gaining Arab 
mass support. In practice, this meant the following: lacking the objective 
capacity to achieve their national rights themselves, the Palestinians 
needed the support and capacities of the Arab masses. To achieve their 
liberation, Palestinians had to mobilise Arabs behind their struggle and 
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assume the position of progressives and radical nationalists in the Arab 
world. In short, they needed to become what they actually claimed they 
were: revolutionaries. As Amin put it: the liberation struggle can only 
succeed if it is also a social revolution.48
 If anything, 1970 showed how difficult it would be for the Palestinians to 
get their national rights with effectively the whole world against them. How 
to overcome this impediment was a brief topic of debate within the PLO. Its 
outcome, however, never led to the desired structural-organisational changes 
that would empower a mass movement: bureaucracy and opportunism won 
out. There was to be no revolution within the revolution as Palestinian 
radicals (like Husam Khatib) wanted.49 In his powerful critique of Palestinian 
nationalism, Marxist philosopher Sadiq Jalal al-Azm blamed the PLOs defeat 
in 1970 on its lack of ideological preparedness for the role Palestinians were 
in a position to assume in the Arab world: that of social revolutionaries. For 
al-Azm, the PLO ironically ended up replicating exactly the same mistakes 
of its Arab petty-bourgeois counterparts (like Nasser). Palestinians repeated 
rather than transformed Arab nationalist defeats: 1970 was like 1967.50 
And like their Arab counterparts, the Palestinian elite ultimately ended up 
dependent on the US for security, support, and patronage. 
 What this tells us about the Israeli role in the region is quite clear. Israeli 
interventions have ended up pushing the whole geopolitical alignment of 
the Arab elite into the American sphere. And that has been an enormous and 
sustained effort. Control of oil in and of itself could not have achieved it: the 
US needed an activist warring state to help it perform this task. For this service, 
Israel has been substantially rewarded. Since 1967, the US has been Israels 
single-most important strategic ally, supporting it diplomatically, politically 
and economically, and allowing it to continue to expand and colonise the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip, go unpunished for its countless violations of 
international law, including its invasion of Lebanon in 1982 (which cost 20,000 
mostly civilian lives), its occupation until 2000 of a long stretch of Lebanese 
land (which it called its security zone), and its occupation and annexation of 
East Jerusalem and the Syrian Golan Heights. Without US support, none of 
this would have been possible. Israels expansion would have been rolled back, 
as it had been in 1956. Operating within the parameters and imperatives of 
US empire has freed Israel from conforming to the international consensus 
which all the world shares, bar the US (with the momentary exception of the 
Rogers Plan of 1970, which was sabotaged by Nixon-Kissinger): a two-state 
solution based on full withdrawal to the 1967 borders, the dismantling of 
settlements, and the creation of a Palestinian state. To complete its mission 
of colonising Palestine, Zionists had therefore to fulfil Theodor Herzls 
racist prophecy in The Jewish State: form a portion of a rampart of Europe 
against Asia, an outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism.51 To expand, 
Israel has had to subordinate itself to US imperial imperatives and become 
dependent on the US (which at times generates Israeli public resentment at 
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The 1950s and early 1960s fostered an illusion that Israel could be truly 
independent economically and politically, even surrounded by a sea of 
hostile Arab states. The 1973 War badly eroded that confidence. Since 
then, Israelis have come to understand that adequate modern weapons are 
too expensive for a small state to obtain without close allies and economic 
support from abroad. Their level of frustration has grown as has their 
realization of their inevitable dependency on Washington. That frustration 
periodically produces the tendency to lash out against the very American 
leaders whose continued support is most needed.52 
Such moments aside (the most recent being Sharons accusation that in the 
immediate aftermath of 9/11, Israel was being abandoned by the US in the 
same way that Czechoslovakia was abandoned by the allies in 1938), Israel 
has indeed understood that there is no occupation, no expansion, and no 
rejection of Palestinian national rights without US support. As long as this 
agenda continues to be the dominant one in Israel, its reliance on the US 
will continue. Chomsky describes this bind thus: 
There can be little doubt that from shortly after the 1967 conquest, 
Israel has been moving in the directions indicated earlier: international 
isolation apart from pariah states, dependence on the US with the 
concomitant pressure to serve US interests, militarization of society, 
the rise of religious-chauvinist fanaticism, the internal feed-back from 
the policies of oppression and domination, an increasing sense of the 
inevitability of permanent conflict and with it, the perceived need to 
disrupt the region and establish a form of Israeli hegemony under the 
US aegis.53
The US has thus allowed, encouraged, and aided the continued Israeli 
colonisation of Palestine. The expansion of 1967 is indeed a continuation of 
the 1948 logic of occupation and dispossession, which has defined the Zionist 
movement in Palestine from the beginning. What was novel about 1967 was 
that it went against the international consensus: Israel was seen as occupier 
where before it had been seen as victim. To legitimate this state of affairs, 
expansionism became the dominant doctrine of the Israeli elite. Colonialism 
was strengthened and consolidated in Israeli politics and society, breeding new 
political ideologies and practices of occupation and settlement. Nur Masalha 
has described this process well in his Imperial Israel and the Palestinians: The 
Politics of Expansion: 
The war produced a spectacular territorial expansion. This territorial 
expansion made messianic religious and ultra-orthodox thinking seem 
highly credible. The 1967 conquests also made the historical Revisionist 
maximalist vision highly relevant. All the ingredients of Israels new 
right radicalism  militarism, ultra-nationalism, territorial expansionism, 
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and neo-religiosity  produced political movements, including the new 
territorial maximalism of the Whole Land of Israel Movement and the 
fundamentalist settlements movement of Gush Emunim.54
Occupation, therefore, further fortified Israeli rejection of the Palestinian 
right of self-determination. Partition (albeit inequitable, leaving Palestinians 
22 per cent of their homeland) was actively rejected, bolstered by US 
rejectionism. 
 It is also important to emphasise that 1967 both reinforced and 
transformed existing Israeli national security patterns of militarisation. 
Baruch Kimmerling has shown that Israeli civilian militarism has always 
been dominant in Israel: The situation arises when the civilian leaders and 
the led both regard the primary military and strategic considerations as being 
self-evidently the only or the predominant considerations in most societal 
and political decisions or priority ordering. The military-political nexus rules 
over the Palestinians and defines the national objectives (including economic) 
of the Israeli collectivity. After 1967, this prioritising of national security was 
modified by the amplification of the ideological-political sphere of religious 
Zionism.55 The Greater Israel ideology became wedded to strategic state 
considerations, and the former was fostered and supported by the latter: 
thus the new orientation spawned fringe variants that favoured the 
expulsion of the entire non-Jewish population of the territories either 
immediately or as a result of a deliberate programme that would create 
circumstances favourable to such dispersion (for example, war on a local-
regional scale). Jewish settlements were established feverishly in regions 
of the occupied territories densely populated by Palestinians so as to 
guarantee control over the whole conquered area, and create irreversible 
fait accompli.56
Kimmerling has developed this line of analysis further in his recent Politicide: 
Ariel Sharons War Against the Palestinians. Here he argues that occupation has 
already corrupted Israeli democracy to such an extent that Israel can no 
longer be considered a liberal democracy: it is now a Herrenvolk democracy: 
This term, coined to describe South Africa under Apartheid [OED dates it 
back to the Nazis], describes a regime in which one group of its subjects (the 
citizens) enjoys full rights and another group (the non-citizens) enjoys none. 
The laws of Israel have become the laws of a master people and the morality 
that of lords of the land.57
 Important though this emphasis is to understanding Israeli policies in 
the Occupied Territories, it ignores the fact that Israel itself has always been 
defined by its particularist components. Post-1967 is a mere continuation of 
post-1948, but now in a new environment where decolonisation is a powerful 
global ideological force (hence the UN response). The questions that 
Kimmerling never raises are: When was Israeli democracy ever uncorrupted 
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by colonialism? When did Israel treat even its own citizens as equals? The 
military government of 1948-1966, which only applied to Palestinian citizens 
of Israel, is clear evidence that Israel has never actually been a liberal 
democracy: its continuing exclusionary definition as Jewish and democratic 
is further evidence of that.58 In the post-1967 period, then, Zionist exclusivism 
has merely been extended, revitalised, and projected onto the West Bank 
and Gaza. For the Israeli elite, 1967 is like 1948: the similarities are more 
important than the differences.59
 The dynamic of American Empire/Israeli colonialism is, therefore, circular: 
US support bolsters Israeli colonialism and occupation, which bolsters Israeli 
militarisation of state and society, generates new ideological and political 
justifications, and breeds new religious fanaticisms, leading to further 
indigenous resistance and to more US interventions in the region. A cycle 
of violence if ever there was one, ultimately determined by US imperialism. 
The US thus becomes both a necessary and sufficient condition for Israels 
colonial expansionism. Without it, Israel would be a pariah state. Without 
it, conditions of peaceful coexistence in the region are much more likely. 
Without it, Israeli militarism and Jewish fundamentalism in Israel would be 
on the defensive; and the mobilisation of internal domestic forces calling 
for the abandonment of the national security ethic and the rejection of 
living by the sword would have a real chance of gaining political ascendancy 
in Israel. Siding with, serving, depending, and, even subordinating itself 
to the imperatives of US empire in the region can only reinforce the Arab 
majority perception that Israel is a hostile presence. Militarised security can 
be no basis for peace and reconciliation. Real security can only be achieved 
if Israelis come to be seen as a part of the region and not as an imposition 
on it: in order for that coexistence to take place, the whole logic of Jewish 
colonisation needs to be questioned. 
 Which is exactly what didnt happen in Oslo. On the contrary, Oslo was 
about further colonisation, further expansion, and further domination and 
control. The early critics of Oslo (most prominently, Edward Said,60 Noam 
Chomsky, Meron Benvenisti) were proven right: Oslo was a victory for Zionism 
and a humiliating defeat for Palestinian nationalism. The PLO aborted the 
Intifada (the main reason for Israels willingness to negotiate), legalised the 
occupation, and became Israels colonial enforcer. As Samih K. Farsoun has 
argued: Israel achieved what it set out to do since at least the signing of 
the Camp David Accords with Egypt in 1978: It won limited functional civil 
autonomy for the Palestinians of the occupied territories and a legalized 
tight grip on the land, resources, economy, and security of the areas.61 No 
sovereignty, no national rights, and no end of occupation: the US-sponsored 
peace process was as rejectionist of Palestinians right to independence and 
self-determination as the post-Kissinger foreign policy consensus was.
 If Israel consolidated its occupation in Oslo, the US reaped the fruits of 
its victory over the Soviet Union and consolidated its hold over the Middle 
East. The New World Order declared by Bush Sr in 1991 set this process in 
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motion. Iraq had to be tamed and cut back to size, and its invasion of Kuwait 
provided an excellent excuse for that. The end of the war with Iran had left it 
with a bloated army, a huge war debt, and resentment against Arab oil regimes 
and US double-dealing.62 Saddam Hussein was perceived as a threat to US 
global strategy: oil had to be protected and regional stability (that is a pro-US 
status quo) reaffirmed. The spectacle of the Gulf War achieved this when 
Iraq was bombed back to the pre-industrial era (as one UN report put it). It 
is doubtful that such a diminution of state capacities, economic and political 
independence, and military power could ever have been realised without 
force. Though there was clearly an element of demonstration effect for both 
global and US domestic consumption in the projection of American military 
might, only war could significantly diminish Iraqi state power, consolidate 
American military presence, and safeguard the pre-eminence of US political 
and economic interests in the region. Arab oil regimes were protected, and 
Israeli military supremacy was assured: Iraq would never be able to pose 
any sort of threat to either Saudi Arabia or Israel (and, if Bush Sr had had 
enough support for regime change then, the US wouldnt have had to wait 
for what Rice called the opportunity of post-9/11 to occupy Iraq). Only war, 
thus, could have satisfied the material and ideological requirements of US 
imperialism. 
 The end of the Cold War generated a peculiar expectation with regard to US 
policy towards Israel: Israel would become far less important for the US. Because 
the Gulf War coalition excluded Israel (and included Syria, Saudi Arabia, and 
Egypt), and because Bush Sr delayed a ten billion dollar loan-guarantee to Israel 
until it agreed to participate in the Madrid Peace conference, which came on 
the heels of the Gulf War, Israels role in US empire was perceived to have been 
diminished. The days of the strategic asset thesis were over, it was claimed: 
the US was now freer to create a more balanced foreign policy strategy in line 
with the international consensus of the impermissibility of acquiring territory 
by force. The reality was quite different, however: even during the Gulf War 
crisis the US forcefully rejected Husseins (self-interested) linkage argument: 
Iraq would leave Kuwait, Israel would leave the Occupied Territories. No such 
universal standards were applied: double standards were the order of the 
day.63 The Madrid conference ended up in near total deadlock. Bushs peace 
and justice were as elusive as ever. The 1990s would in fact prove to be the 
most fruitful time in US-Israel relations. The alliance became stronger than 
ever, intensifying and deepening. It is to Chomskys realism that we owe this 
judgment: the end of the Cold War would only bring tactical modifications 
not substantial changes in US global strategy. Anti-nationalism and hostility 
to social radicalism would continue to define its agenda, as he predicted. And 
this would also apply to Israel, as the following statement from Israeli military 
strategist Shlomo Gazit clearly shows: 
Israels main task has not changed at all, and it remains of crucial 
importance. Its location at the center of the Arab Muslim Middle East 
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predestines Israel to be a devoted guardian of stability in all the countries 
surrounding it. Its [role] is to protect the existing regimes: to prevent 
or halt the processes of radicalization and to block the expansion of 
fundamentalist religious zealotry.64 
The New World Order is, then, very much like the old world order: US 
and Israel fighting common enemies and satisfying mutual elite interests. 
The only difference lies in the realisation of more amendable conditions 
of operation. US global primacy has been the main outcome of the Cold 
War, and after the Gulf War Israels regional military superiority was again 
reconfirmed. One other slight variation is relevant here: a new enemy. If 
Arab nationalism was the enemy of the Cold War period, major factions 
of Islamic fundamentalism are the enemies of the New World Order (and 
this is in no way to equate the social content of each ideology). Once a Cold 
War ally against nationalism, Islamic fundamentalism has turned into a foe. 
Examples abound. Two main ones will suffice: Mujahideen in Afghanistan 
(Taliban, Bin Laden and al-Qaida) and radical fundamentalists in the Arab 
world. In the Palestinian context, the Muslim Brotherhood is an example of 
the latter. It went from being supported by Israel against nationalist Fatah 
to mutating into Hamas and becoming the main agent of anti-colonial 
struggle and Palestinian self-determination in the Occupied Territories. The 
cost of this shift is mainly paid by local societies: with the fundamentalists, 
regressive social agendas rule and the sphere of individual liberty (already 
severely curtailed by Arab secular nationalism) shrinks even more. This is not 
a problem that worries Israel or the US much, as long as the fundamentalists 
are suppressed or kept out of office (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 
etc). For US-Israel, the problem with democracy in the Middle East today 
is the problem of Islamic fundamentalism: most free elections would result 
in fundamentalists getting into power, as recent victories by Hamas and the 
United Iraqi Alliance in Iraq (and by the FIS in Algeria before that) show. 
Denying real democratic sovereignty remains a fundamental premise of US 
policy. So after the recent elections in Palestine (and the US hope for a Fatah 
win), the US now demonises and boycotts majority-elected Hamas and seeks 
to punish and starve Palestinians for their democratic choice (as a recent 
NY Times headline put it). The War on Terrorism is the New World Order 
unleashed and unbound. It replays the Cold War dynamic, aims to reproduce 
its oppressive structure, and continues to satisfy longstanding US interests in 
Middle East: control of oil and rejection of Arab radicalism, which have lead 
to support for colonial Israel. And so it goes.
 What this brief analysis of imperialism-colonialism teaches us is clear. 
The US has been determining major economic and political outcomes in 
the Middle East since at least 1967, with Israel continuing to play a crucial 
role in their realisation. In Israel-Palestine, this has meant that force and 
colonial peace have alternated as main instruments of policy, with the main 
objective being a constant: Jewish supremacy in Palestine  as much land as 
64. Quoted in Noam 
Chomsky, Pirates 
and Emperors, Old 
and New, New York, 
South End Press, 
2002, p166. 
ISRAEL IN US EMPIRE     51
possible, as few Palestinians as possible. The US has exploited this Zionist 
imperative for its own interests in the region, and has fostered a militarised 
and fundamentalist Israel in the process. This reality can be gauged in Israels 
most recent parliamentary elections. Gideon Levy has put it well: An absolute 
majority of the MKs (Members of Knesset) in the 17th Knesset will hold a 
position based on a lie; that Israel does not have a partner for peace. An 
absolute majority of MKs in the next Knesset do not believe in peace, nor do 
they even want it  just like their voters  and worse than that, dont regard 
Palestinians as equal human beings. Racism has never had so many supporters. 
It is the real hit of this election campaign.65 For the Palestinians, the impact 
of US-Israel has been much worse: collapse of the secular national project and 
national unity; continuing annexation of lands and resources; enclosure and 
enclavisation; fragmentation, de-mobilisation, and collective paralysis; and 
unending death and suffering. If for Levy Israelis are One Racist Nation, 
for Amira Hass Palestinians have become: A Nation of Beggars: For it is 
not natural disasters that have transformed the Palestinians into a nation 
that lives on handouts from the world; it is Israels accelerating colonialist 
process.66 This too is an outcome of US-Israel, imperialism-colonialism. 
 Between colonialism, looming starvation, and sumud (steadfastness), hope 
for real change seems remote, if not impossible. And this may yet prove to be 
imperialisms most catastrophic effect.
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